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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Of all the periods in the history of philosophy, Renaissance philosophy is 
one of the more neglected and maligned backwaters, at least in the company 
of historians of philosophy. Although there is a steady stream of excellent 
work by intellectual historians and literary scholars, on the whole 
philosophers have remained far more sceptical about the period.1 A recent 
volume exploring philosophical themes from the thirteenth to the 
seventeenth centuries by Robert Pasnau, aimed at making connections 
between medieval and early modern philosophy, is sceptical about the 
importance of the period in the few remarks it offers.2  
 
                                                        
1 The label ‘Renaissance’ is itself a contested term, famously used to refer to a distinct 
period and intellectual movement by Nietzsche’s Basel colleague Jacob Burckhardt (in The 
Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore [Oxford: Phaidon, 
1945]), but whose value has been increasingly called into question. The chronological 
limits of the period it is used to refer to are equally contested, ranging from a narrow 1400-
1500 to a much broader 1350-1600. For present purposes I use the label ‘Renaissance 
philosophy’ to refer to that period in the history of philosophy that falls between the better 
defined periods of medieval philosophy and early modern philosophy. Inevitably there is 
overlap at either end. 
2 See Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), who writes (p. 93) “It is perhaps too much to say that there is no philosophy in 
authors like Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino” and (p. 419) “the so-called 
Renaissance philosophers”. Note also the recent event at the British Academy (the Dawes 
Hicks Symposium ‘Continuity and Innovation in Medieval and Modern Philosophy of 
Knowledge, Mind and Language’, held on the 28th October 2011), that focused on making 
connections between medieval and early modern philosophy, while passing over 
Renaissance philosophy in silence. 
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This was not always so. Last century Ernst Cassirer and Paul Oskar 
Kristeller both wrote philosophical and historically informed studies of 
themes in Renaissance philosophy, and Kristeller of course went on to do so 
much to shape the modern discipline of Renaissance Studies.3 The two 
collaborated with John Herman Randall to produce an anthology of 
translated texts published in 1948, and in the introduction to that volume 
Kristeller mapped out the philosophy of the period.4 Although some now 
question the rigid divisions proposed by Kristeller, even so his framework 
remains a valuable point of departure and it will be helpful briefly to outline 
it here.  
 
Kristeller suggests that philosophy in the Renaissance was dominated by 
three distinct movements: Humanism, Platonism, and Aristotelianism.5 The 
question whether Humanism ought to count as a philosophical movement 
(and in particular whether Humanists deserve to be called philosophers) is 
one that we shall turn to shortly. Recent work by Lodi Nauta has done an 
excellent job in showing the philosophical significance of the work of the 
Humanist Lorenzo Valla.6 But note that even if one were deeply sceptical 
about the philosophical credentials of the Humanists, Kristeller’s model 
emphasizes that Renaissance thought was shaped by other, unambiguously 
philosophical, movements as well. We shall turn to the Platonic movement 
associated with Marsilio Ficino later on. As for the continuity of the 
medieval Aristotelian tradition, those modern scholars making connections 
between medieval and early modern philosophy should note that Kristeller’s 
model already accommodates the continuity of Aristotelianism through to 
the seventeenth century, as well as encompassing the Humanist and Platonic 
traditions that they tend to overlook.7                                                          
3 See Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. 
Mario Domandi (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), and Paul Oskar Kristeller, The 
Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, trans. Virginia Conant (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1943).  
4 Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, John Herman Randall, eds, The Renaissance 
Philosophy of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). The ‘General 
Introduction’ is credited to Kristeller and Randall; I refer just to Kristeller partly for the 
sake of brevity and partly because the theme I mention was a recurrent one in Kristeller’s 
work (see e.g. the opening three chapters of his Renaissance Thought and its Sources [New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1979]).  
5 Ibid, p. 2.  
6 Lodi Nauta, In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Valla's Humanist Critique of 
Scholastic Philosophy, I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009). 
7 On the topic of the continuation of the Scholastic tradition through the Renaissance and 
into the early modern period it is worth noting two recent collections of essays devoted to 
the philosophy of Francisco Suárez: Daniel Schwartz, ed., Interpreting Suárez: Critical 
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2. POLIZIANO 
 
Kristeller’s threefold division of Renaissance philosophy is a useful point of 
departure but has been criticized for implying rigid divisions between three 
distinct movements. Inevitably things are never quite so neat and clear cut, 
and I doubt Kristeller was ever naive enough to think they were. A case in 
point is Angelo Poliziano, famed as a Humanist, but also closely associated 
with the Platonic circle around Marsilio Ficino, who towards the end of his 
career lectured on Aristotle. Just as modern academic philosophers might 
question Poliziano’s status as a philosopher proper, so too did his 
contemporaries, and Aristotelian philosophers working within a broadly 
Scholastic tradition attacked Poliziano for moving onto their turf by 
attempting to lecture on the Stagirite.  
 
Poliziano began his foray into teaching Aristotle with a series of lectures on 
the Nicomachean Ethics in 1490-91, followed by lectures on parts of the 
Organon (Categories, On Interpretation, also the Sophistical Refutations) in 
1491-92, and then a series of lectures on the Prior Analytics in 1492-93. In 
the opening lecture to the last of these, his Praelectio in Priora Aristotelis 
Analytica, Poliziano responded to his critics via a series of reflections on the 
nature of philosophy and the relationship between philosophy and 
philology. This Praelectio has gained the alternative title Lamia as 
Poliziano opens by characterizing his critics as lamias, busybodies with 
removable eyes who gossip about the business of others when out and 
about, but with no perception of themselves when at home. This leads on to 
a discussion about the nature of the philosopher. Poliziano begins with a 
somewhat unflattering account of Pythagoras (reputed to be the first person 
to use the word ‘philosopher’) that implies that not being a philosopher is no 
bad thing. However, as the discussion progresses Poliziano offers a more 
thoughtful and positive account of what it means to be a philosopher, 
drawing on various Platonic sources as well as Iamblichus’ Protrepticus. On 
this account the philosopher is someone with self-knowledge who takes care 
of his soul, and so cultivates virtue. This turns the tables on the Scholastic 
lamias, who claim to be philosophers but lack the necessary self-knowledge 
and so fail to live up to the ancient definition that Poliziano is keen to 
resurrect. Poliziano is happy to admit he doesn’t meet this ancient standard 
himself, at the same time implying that neither do his critics. Instead 
Poliziano is content to call himself an interpreter of Aristotle rather than a 
philosopher, but he then goes on to add that his role as a philologist                                                                                                                                              
Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), and Benjamin Hill and Henrik 
Lagerlund, eds, The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012).  
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(grammaticus) places him above all other disciplines, including philosophy, 
and this makes him qualified to interpret any kind of text. The earlier 
sudden shift from mocking to idolizing the philosopher is followed by this 
sudden shift from modesty to megalomania. Poliziano admits he has no 
formal training in philosophy but adds that he is well versed in the ancient 
Greek commentators on Aristotle, implying that this is a far better 
qualification to interpret Aristotle than a contemporary scholastic education.  
 
The recent volume edited by Christopher Celenza comprises a series of 
introductory essays by various hands followed by the text of the 
Praelectio/Lamia with a facing translation and notes. The text is taken from 
the critical edition prepared by Ari Wesseling and the notes draw on 
Wesseling’s commentary.8 Celenza’s new volume offers the first translation 
of the text into English and the essays by various hands offer a number of 
interesting contextual discussions. However, it is a supplement to 
Wesseling’s volume rather than a replacement and anyone seriously 
interested in the text will still want to have Wesseling’s volume to hand. 
Celenza’s translation is highly readable, rendering the text into an accessible 
modern idiom. The text and translation are divided into numbered 
paragraphs, whereas Wesseling’s text is not, his commentary referring 
simply to page and line numbers of his edition. So one minor gripe is that it 
would have been helpful to have had included Wesseling’s page and line 
numbers in order to ease cross-reference to his commentary, not to mention 
being able to cite the text according to a single system of reference.  
 
But before one gets to the text and translation Celenza offers us four 
introductory essays, one by his own hand and others by Francesco Caruso, 
Igor Candido, and Denis J.-J. Robichaud. Celenza’s own essay offers a 
helpful overview of both the text and the context in which it was written and 
as such forms a fine introduction. An attempt to draw a parallel with 
Wittgenstein (pp. 34-5) seems a bit tenuous, but the discussion seemed 
much closer to the mark when emphasizing the presence of Stoic elements 
alongside the more explicit Platonic and Neoplatonic influences (p. 38).  
 
Caruso’s essay attempts to map out connections between Poliziano and John 
of Salisbury. The discussion is informed and interesting but, for this 
reviewer, ultimately unconvincing. It is true that John of Salisbury was also 
a Humanistically minded commentator on Aristotle’s logic but there is no 
real evidence presented for the claim that Poliziano drew on John’s 
Metalogicon and the textual parallels outlined on pp. 82-3 seem somewhat 
thin. Even so, Caruso’s placing of Poliziano’s text within a tradition                                                         
8 Angelo Poliziano, Lamia: Praelectio in Priora Aristotelis Analytica, ed. Ari Wesseling 
(Leiden: Brill, 1986).  
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stretching back through Petrarch to the Humanism of the twelfth century is a 
helpful and worthwhile exercise in contextualization.  
 
Candido seeks to consider the Praelectio/Lamia alongside the famous 
epistolary debate between Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Ermolao 
Barbaro on the relative merits of Humanism and Scholasticism.9 Doing so 
makes good sense but, again, although Candido’s essay is packed with 
helpful contextual material, it doesn’t quite manage to deliver. It is only 
after 25 or so pages of preamble that we finally turn to the Pico-Barbaro 
exchange and the essay ends before reaching any kind of detailed analysis 
of the parallels between the claims of the two texts.  
 
Robichaud’s essay addressing Poliziano’s debts to Neoplatonism is likely to 
be the one of most interest to historians of philosophy. Unsurprisingly one 
of the themes that emerges in this essay is Poliziano’s intellectual 
relationship with Ficino, and Robichaud suggests that both were “doing 
stylistic readings of Plotinus’s Enneads around the same time and in 
dialogue with each other” (p. 135). Poliziano’s debts to Iamblichus in the 
Praelectio/Lamia are explicit (Celenza § 58; Wesseling p. 13,38) but rather 
than go over these in too much detail Robichaud focuses his attention on 
wider issues concerning Neoplatonic models of textual interpretation in 
Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus, focusing on late ancient debates about the 
relationship between philosophy and philology. Although chronologically 
more distant, this close attention to the texts that Poliziano (and Ficino) 
were actually reading offers the most enlightening window into Poliziano’s 
way of thinking.  
 
Notwithstanding the few critical comments above, all of the essays have 
much to offer and the volume as a whole does a fine job in making 
Poliziano’s little-known text significantly more accessible.  
 
3. FICINO 
 
As I have noted, one of the themes in the essays discussing Poliziano’s 
Praelectio/Lamia is Poliziano’s relationship with Ficino. While Robichaud 
stresses their shared debt to Neoplatonism others, noting Ficino’s debt to 
Scholastic ways of doing philosophy, align him with the lamias. The                                                         
9 Pico’s letter to Barbaro is available in English translation in Arturo B. Fallico and Herman 
Shapiro, eds, Renaissance Philosophy I: The Italian Philosophers (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1967), 105-17. I also note a helpful discussion of the debate in another relatively 
recent book on Renaissance philosophy: Jill Kraye, ‘Pico on the Relationship of Rhetoric 
and Philosophy’ in M. V. Dougherty, ed., Pico della Mirandola: New Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 13-36.  
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volume as a whole tends to vacillate between presenting Poliziano and 
Ficino as mutual admirers or intellectual adversaries.  
 
Ficino is the subject of another recent book on Renaissance philosophy, a 
collection of essays also published in the series Brill’s Studies in Intellectual 
History. This collection has its origins in a conference held in London in 
2004. It is in many ways a companion piece to a previous collection of 
essays on Ficino also inspired by a London conference, published in 2002.10 
Both volumes also share a co-editor (Rees), a number of contributors 
(Toussaint, Hirai, Clucas, Rees), and the earlier volume was also published 
in the same series (they are volumes 108 and 198). Both volumes address a 
range of broadly religious themes and both volumes address Ficino’s later 
legacy. Anyone familiar with that earlier volume should find this new 
volume equally interesting.  
 
The Introduction bullishly asserts that Ficino’s importance is well 
recognized in many fields, including philosophy (p. 1). Alas I fear that is not 
quite the case yet, even among historians of philosophy (cf. n. 2 above), 
although the continuing series of Ficino publications in the I Tatti 
Renaissance Library will hopefully encourage philosophers to start to 
explore his work more than they have to date.11 A couple of pages later the 
tone is more defensive but realistic, suggesting that the value of some of the 
papers to follow is that they challenge the common judgement that Ficino 
was “primarily a translator rather than an original philosophical thinker” (p. 
3).  
 
The first half of the volume is entitled ‘The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino’ 
and its eight papers address a range of themes in his work. Although they all 
make interesting reading, taken together I doubt they will convince many 
contemporary philosophers of Ficino’s philosophical weight. Contributions 
include discussions of levitation (Toussaint), astrology (Clydesdale), and the 
magical power of hymns (Wear). Ficino’s relationships with his 
contemporaries Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Georgios Gemistos 
Plethon are recurrent themes (esp. Blum), and we also hear much about his 
use of and debts to Plato (Aasdalen), Lucretius and Galen (Hankins), and                                                         
10 Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. Michael J. B. Allen and 
Valery Rees with Martin Davies, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History 108 (Leiden: Brill, 
2002).  
11 The major step forwards is the edition and translation of Ficino’s Platonic Theology, by 
Michael J. B. Allen and James Hankins in 6 volumes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2001-6). This is now being supplemented with a series of volumes devoted to his 
Commentaries on Plato: the first volume (also by Allen) with commentaries on the 
Phaedrus and Ion appeared in 2008, and a two-volume edition of his commentary on the 
Parmenides (by Maude Vanhaelen) is scheduled for publication in 2012.  
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Plotinus (Dillon). A number of the papers in this section focus on material 
drawn from Ficino’s correspondence (Rees, Clydesdale), while the more 
philosophically interesting contributions are those that get stuck into the 
details of Ficino’s magnum opus, the Platonic Theology. Particularly worthy 
of note are the contributions by James Hankins and John Dillon.  
 
Hankins' chapter on 'monstrous melancholy' suggests that the origins of this 
idea in Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy can be traced back to 
Ficino. I don't have much to say on the main concern of the chapter but 
Hankins makes two points about influences on Ficino that are worth 
noting. The first is that Ficino was a follower of Galen as well as Plato, as 
much interested in the health of the body as the health of the soul (p. 31). 
From Galen he took a concern for the body and the idea that the body can 
affect the soul, both of which temper his Neoplatonism. The second is that 
Ficino was a fan of Lucretius in his youth and, although he later repudiated 
it, his familiarity with Lucretius formed an important influence on the 
development of his mature work (p. 34).12 One might say that Ficino's 
Platonic Theology is his reply to Lucretius' On the Nature of Things. Both 
of these observations help to complicate our picture of Ficino’s 
philosophical development and to rescue him from the charge of merely 
regurgitating late Neoplatonism.  
 
Ficino’s debt to Neoplatonism is the topic of Dillon’s chapter, focusing on 
Plotinus. It is well known that Ficino was heavily indebted to Proclus – 
especially in his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides – but Dillon suggests 
that Ficino has good reasons to want to distance himself from Proclus due to 
the latter’s multiplication of gods, as well as his claim that the highest 
principle is, as Dillon puts it, “supra-essential and supra-noetic” (p. 15).  
 
So, notwithstanding his genuine admiration for Proclus and late 
Neoplatonism, Ficino is theologically committed to downplay these two 
aspects of Neoplatonic thought. Dillon suggests that the way Ficino tries to 
do this in his Platonic Theology (esp. 2.6, 2.12) is to turn to Plotinus. 
Although in some respects Plotinus is as committed to these two aspects as 
Proclus, Dillon draws attention to a number of tractates in the Enneads (esp. 
6.4-5, 6.8) where they are given much lesser prominence.  
 
In the first of these (the pair Enn. 6.4-5) the distinction between Intellect 
and the One is played down, making it much easier for Ficino to identity                                                         
12 This topic is also addressed in another recent book worth noting: Alison Brown, The 
Return of Lucretius to Renaissance Florence, I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), esp. pp. 92-4, citing a draft of Hankins’ 
chapter.  
  8 
both with each other and with God. This suits his purposes very well in his 
construction of a monotheistic Neoplatonism. The second (Enn. 6.8) 
discusses the will of the One, again opening the way for its identification 
with God. In particular Plotinus’ discussion seeks to combine divine 
freedom with necessity in a way that proves highly appealing to Ficino, who 
follows a similar line in the Platonic Theology (2.12). Dillon points to a 
series of conceptual (rather than textual) parallels but the lack of explicit 
textual debt is hardly a problem for his argument given what we know about 
Ficino’s thorough immersion in Plotinus’ texts. Dillon stresses at the end 
that this is not merely a repetition of Plotinian ideas, as Ficino’s very 
different theological context means he has to engage in a creative yet 
“delicate juggling act” (p. 24) when handling Neoplatonic ideas in a 
Christian context.  
 
It is a shame that more of the papers in the first half of the volume did not 
get involved with the detail of philosophical positions in Ficino’s substantial 
philosophical works (such as the Platonic Theology or his commentaries on 
Plato’s Parmenides or Sophist) in the way that Dillon does. For that kind of 
detailed account of Ficino’s philosophy one must look elsewhere.13 Having 
said that, the fact that some of the papers deal with (what now look like) 
more esoteric themes, rightly highlights the distance between Ficino’s 
conception of philosophy and our own. The role of levitation or astrology in 
his thought, for instance, have their own rational foundations when 
approached within the context of the Neoplatonic worldview with which he 
is operating, and Toussaint and Clydesdale both do admirable jobs in 
explaining how this is the case.  
 
The second half of the volume is devoted to Ficino’s influence. Some of 
these papers explore his impact beyond the confines of philosophy narrowly 
conceived, including Italian literature (Panizza), occultism (Clucas), and 
alchemy (Forshaw). Others tackle more explicitly philosophical topics. Hiro 
Hirai’s chapter examines Ficino’s theory of spontaneous generation or, to be 
more precise, criticisms of Ficino by the Paduan professor of philosophy 
Fortunio Liceti. Much the chapter is devoted to a close study of Liceti’s On 
The Spontaneous Generation of Living Beings (De spontaneo viventium 
ortu) of 1618. Hirai offers a nice account of Liceti’s analysis of three 
distinct Platonist responses to the problem of (apparent) spontaneous 
generation: ‘junior Platonists’, who refer to the World-Soul as the cause; 
‘major Platonists’, who refer to the Ideas as the cause; and Ficino, who cites 
the ‘earth’s soul’ as the cause (as outlined in Book 4 of the Platonic                                                         
13 In many ways Kristeller’s monograph (see n. 3 above) remains the best available account 
of Ficino’s philosophy, even if it is in some respects outdated, not least due to Kristeller’s 
own subsequent contributions to the field.  
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Theology). Liceti attacks Ficino’s theory, doubting both the existence of an 
earth’s soul and the possibility that such a thing, if it existed, could 
adequately explain the origin of life. Liceti’s objections, as Hirai presents 
them, seem well founded and they also help to bring into focus Ficino’s own 
view. Indeed, it is a somewhat odd view for a Neoplatonist, effectively 
proposing the generation of something ‘higher’ from something ‘lower’, 
when we might expect the order of generation to be the other way round. 
Hirai points to possible influences from Plotinus and Proclus but, following 
Liceti, also notes potential Stoic sources, via Seneca’s Natural Questions or 
Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods. This intriguing suggestion closes 
Hirai’s chapter, which notes that more work might be done on this topic.  
 
One of the most philosophically interesting contributions to the whole 
volume is David Leech’s study of the influence of Ficino on the Cambridge 
Platonist Henry More. Although it is commonly held that Ficino was an 
important influence on the Cambridge Platonists, there are few direct 
citations, making pinning down the nature and extent of that influence a 
difficult task. Leech focuses on More’s arguments for the immortality of the 
soul and the shift in his position that takes place between his earlier 
philosophical poems and his later prose works. In his later works in 
particular More draws on Ficinian arguments against the monopsychism of 
Averroes in order to defend a version of Lockean personal identity (avant la 
lettre), using Ficinian arguments in a philosophical context that Ficino 
would never have known.  
 
What is especially noteworthy in Leech’s account is the way in which it 
highlights continuity in the history of philosophy. More is working within a 
distinctively early modern context (responding to Hobbes, pre-empting 
Locke), drawing on Renaissance arguments (Ficino) in order to respond to a 
problem inherited from medieval philosophy (Averroist monopsychism). 
This neatly brings us back to my opening remarks, for what this account 
does is places Renaissance philosophy in dialogue with both its medieval 
predecessors and its early modern successors. The final contribution to the 
volume, by Constance Blackwell, does something similar, examining 
concordism in Simplicius, Ficino, and Cudworth, emphasizing continuity in 
a Platonic tradition running through late antiquity, the Renaissance, and the 
early modern period.  
 
Both of these volumes are welcome additions to the scholarly literature on 
Renaissance philosophy. Yet they both indicate in different ways how much 
more work remains to be done. The fact that Celenza’s volume makes a text 
available in English for the very first time highlights the extent to which 
Renaissance philosophy remains largely uncharted territory for all but a few 
specialists. Those essays in the volume by Cluclas et al. that engage with 
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Ficino’s Platonic Theology in particular whet the appetite for more thorough 
philosophical studies of this work, studies that will continue to draw 
connections back to late ancient and medieval philosophy, and forwards to 
early modern philosophy.  
 
 
